Introduction
Ethnic minorities are consistently under-represented in all democracies 1 and this may be in part because majority voters discriminate against minority candidates.
2
Conversely there is research showing that visible minorities are more likely to vote for members of their own ethnic or racial group in the US 3 and in proportional representation systems that allow preference voting. 4 While there is also evidence that candidate ethnicity affects voting in British elections, with one exception 5 it has thus far been based on aggregate data or qualitative reports. There are also some interesting questions about the effects of candidate ethnicity that arise from the 1 Bird et al. 2011; Ruedin 2009. 2 E.g. Lewis-Beck et al. 2010; Terkildsen 1993 . 3 E.g. Barreto 2007 Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Collet 2005; Philpot and Walton 2007; Wolfinger 1965. 4 E.g. Berg and Bjoklund 2011; Michon and Tillie 2011; Teney 2010 , although Highton (2004 finds otherwise.
5 Stegmaier et al. 2013. British context that can only now be addressed with high quality individual-level The next section outlines some important features of the context before we discuss previous research and possible mechanisms by which candidate ethnicity might affect vote choice. The data and methodology sections then precede the results and concluding discussion.
Background on ethnicity in British electoral politics
The five main non-White minority groups as identified in the Census question on ethnicity are Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean, and Black African, 6 Ford 2011. 7 Field 2011.
8 Kirkup 2011. 9 While it would be interesting to be able to explore candidate religion effects more generally the available data are inadequate. and together they probably made up around eight per cent of the electorate in 2010. 10 With the exception of some first generation Black Africans from nonCommonwealth countries, members of these groups are all entitled to vote and, if registered, they tend to vote at similar rates to the White British majority. 11 They have also consistently been much more likely to vote Labour than Whites, 12 perhaps mainly because all of the legislation advancing the rights and opportunities of ethnic minorities has been passed by Labour governments.
13
As in other Western countries, there is evidence of discrimination against non-White ethnic minorities in the labour market in Britain. 14 Since the British Social Attitudes surveys began in 1985 they have shown around 30 per cent admitting to being at least somewhat 'prejudiced against people from other races' with relatively little variation. 15 This context raises the question as to whether ethnic minorities are at a disadvantage in the political arena as a result of prejudice and discrimination.
There were record numbers of ethnic minority candidates standing and elected in 2010 (see Table 1 ). However, twenty-seven MPs constitute just four per cent of the total, less than half of the proportion of ethnic minorities in the population as a whole. 16 Most of the increase in the number of ethnic minority MPs between 2005 10 Heath et al. 2011.
11 Heath et al. 2011 . 12 Saggar and Heath 1999.
13 Heath et al. 2013. 14 Wood et al. 2009. 15 Creegan and Robinson 2008.
16 Table 1 includes minorities from groups other than the five main ones and those of mixed origin.
The size of the comparable group in the electorate is hard to estimate but is likely to be at least nine per cent.
and 2010 can be accounted for not by the simple increase in the number of such candidates, but by a new strategy by the Conservatives to ensure several were placed in safe seats.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Before minority candidates face a penalty at the hand of the electorate, they may also be subject to particular difficulties and prejudice at the stage of becoming candidates in the first place. 18 As a result those minority candidates who do survive the selection process are likely to be at least as good if not better quality candidates than their White counterparts. Many will have important experience as a local councillor 19 or strong local support, especially in relatively high minority-density areas. 32 Hewstone et al. 2002; Tajfel 1981; Voci 2010 . 33 Tate 1991.
20

Previous research on the effects of candidate ethnicity in Britain
34 Banducci et al. 2004. candidates focus on voters from their group as core supporters and devote more effort to mobilizing them. Juenke and Preuhs 2012; McDermott 1998; Sigelman et al. 1995. 41 Buttice and Milazzo 2011. Also the mechanism provides plenty of scope for candidates from one group to attract votes of another and it is not explicitly testable with our data.
Group specific issues
The direction and strength of all the mechanisms described above could vary 
Potential moderating factors
To add to the complex set of potential mechanisms that might generate candidate ethnicity effects, there are also a series of factors that might moderate the strength of any candidate ethnicity effects. Such processes would be observed as interaction terms with candidate characteristics.
Firstly, for both Whites and minorities, we expect to see greater discrimination against out-group candidates among those who are more generally prejudiced against ethnic out-groups. 55 In addition, for ethnic minorities, strength of in-group identity and perceived racial discrimination may also be associated with greater support for co-ethnic or non-White candidates. Given recent debates about a backlash against the biraderi system, co-ethnic voting might be weaker for young and second- 70 Clarke et al. 2010 . These data were chosen to maximize variance on the candidate ethnicity variables. They cover 630 of the 632 GB constituencies whereas the BES face-to-face survey used by Stegmaier et al. (2013) includes only 200.
from both the BES face-to-face post-election survey 71 and the Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES) 2010 survey, 72 which is based on a face-to-face probability sample of the five main minority groups in Britain; Black African, Black
Caribbean, Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani. The survey has at least 90 per cent coverage of these populations, but it is disproportionately drawn from areas with high ethnic minority populations.
Methods
The statistical models used to estimate the effects of candidate ethnicity are alternative-specific multinomial probit models. 73 The model uses stacked data, with three rows for each respondent, one for each party. Let x ip be a matrix of alternativespecific variables (i.e. party-respondent combination specific such as leader ratings)
and ε ip be a normally distributed error term, then the utility for voter i of voting for a particular party p = 1, 2 or 3, can be represented as,
The probability that voter i chooses party p is
This model differs from the conditional logit model in the functional form of the distribution of the error term and, more importantly, in allowing the errors to be correlated and thus relaxing the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) Muslim candidate variable is 1 only when both the candidate and the respondent were Muslim, and is otherwise 0.
In the interests of parsimony, the models below include only statistically significant variables that have also been established by previous research. 76 The control Although party contact and orientations to parties and leaders are potential mediating factors between candidate ethnicity and vote choice, their inclusion in the model makes little difference to the estimated candidate effects. While candidate ethnicity effects may operate in part through perceptions of parties, the danger from exclusion of attitudinal variables is that candidate ethnicity coefficients then more likely reflect the extent to which certain candidates stood where their party was (un)popular with 76 The set of all the potential control variables tested is sufficiently large that including all made parameter estimates unstable and incomprehensible. particular groups (i.e. the attitudinal variables help resolve a potential selection bias or non-random allocation problem).
Several other potential controls were also considered but found to be insignificant, Table 2 shows the coefficients from four alternative-specific multinomial probit models of vote choice for Whites who voted for the Conservatives, Labour or Liberal Democrats. The first two terms are alternative-specific intercepts. The main effects of the control variables (those from 'Strength of party id' to 'Incumbent MP') operate in the directions expected. The coefficients for the only respondent-specific 79 We also considered a variable measuring the total number of these emotions mentioned, but this gave similar but less clear results.
80 Voas and Ling 2008. 81 Details of coding for all the attitudinal potential moderators for minorities are not given because they proved to be statistically insignificant.
control show that public sector workers were less likely to vote Conservative than Labour. There was insufficient evidence that the effects of the alternative-specific controls depended on party, except for Distance from contention, for which the fitted interaction terms are in the models. For 'average' effects on the probability scale here and later on we take average marginal effects at the alternative-specific mean for each party and then average across parties (to deal with differences in baseline probabilities) and round to the nearest integer. See discussion of where Conservative candidates generally might have been relatively ignored and so their characteristics matter less. Alternatively it may be that they were better candidates with more party support in accordance with David Cameron's modernization strategy, but only one of the sixteen was on the A-list. There are also some signs than Indian candidates did better when they were standing for the Tories than for other parties.
82
The second development in Model (4) tests the hypothesis that the anti-Muslim candidate effect is stronger for those who have anti-immigrant feelings. Thus Model (4) includes controls for the main effects of anti-immigrant feelings 87 and an interaction between anti-immigrant sentiment and Muslim candidature, which is negative and statistically significant as expected. 88 Since the main effect of Muslim candidature in Model (4) is not significant, it appears that the anti-Muslim candidate effect is predominantly driven by those with anti-immigrant sentiments.
Other potential moderating variables, for both ethnic minority and Muslim candidate effects, were found to be statistically insignificant. Thus we found insufficient evidence that candidate ethnicity effects were weaker in marginal constituencies, or for those further from contention, or where the minority candidate was the incumbent MP (by contrast with findings for US cities 89 ). Similarly, ethnic electoral penalties are no weaker for those with strong party identification, or those contacted by the minority candidate's party. Unlike Carsey or Avery and Fine we found no tendency for the effect of minority candidature to depend on the ethnic composition of the constituency, 90 nor for the Muslim candidate effect to be weaker where there is a greater proportion of Muslims, regardless of controlling for anti-immigrant sentiment.
Marginal effects (differences in predicted probabilities from the three-party choice) 87 The Con*Anti-Immigrant and LD*Anti-Immigrant terms are insignificant because they are mediated by attitudes to the parties (analysis not shown). 88 In further analysis not shown, the interaction effect between EM candidature and anti-immigrant feelings was not significant. 89 Hajnal 2001. 90 Avery and Fine 2009; Carsey 2009. from Model (4) are presented in Table 3 There is a negative effect of Muslim candidature for Labour and Liberal Democrats, which is weak and statistically insignificant for those without anti-immigrant feelings but over 10 points for Muslim candidates among anti-immigrant voters.
91 Since voters at the mean are disproportionately likely to vote LD, the Party and Leader feeling scores were adjusted to 5 for Labour and 4 for the Liberal Democrats to ensure that the baseline probabilities came out close to the actual share of the vote. They were Con 41, Lab 37 and LD 23. 92 The effects are larger the closer the baseline probability is to 50 per cent.
Turning to the electoral behaviour of ethnic minorities, Table 4 shows a similar set of alternative-specific multinomial probit models to those in Table 2 , but estimated with ethnic minorities who voted for one of three main parties only. The control variables are similar, but with some minor variations. Pooled analysis of ethnic minorities all together revealed uniformly null results, albeit in the expected directions. These are not shown because they masked important differences between specific ethnic groups. The basis for each model is indicated in the first row. The control variables for all the models in Table 4 are the same and similar to those for the Whites, but with some minor variations. The principle for the selection of control variables was that anything significant for the pooled ethnic minority models should be included. Model (3) shows that there is a strong co-ethnic candidate effect for Pakistanis, with 93 The tiny number of non-Muslims from these groups were excluded for simplicity.
94 There were only four Bangladeshi candidates in constituencies where we also had Bangladeshi respondents, and three of these were in Bethnal Green and Bow.
an average bonus of 8 percentage points over non-co-ethnic candidates. Model (4) Africans. Because the results are similarly null for each of these groups separately Table 4 shows only two pooled models (5 and 6) for these groups. If anything the cominority and co-ethnicity effects are negative, even after excluding the small number of Muslim respondents who tend to weaken the chances of finding positive-co-ethnic effects. Since the candidature coefficients in these and similar models are clearly statistically insignificant, there is insufficient evidence for candidate ethnicity effects for these groups. Perhaps the most striking of these null findings is that even those who thought that 98 Co-ethnic voting does seem to be stronger when there was also contact with a co-ethnic canvasser (party worker) but there were so few respondents in this category that this result could easily be accidental and in any event appears to affect very few people. 99 In line with claims that the political significance of biraderi is being challenged by young and second generation Pakistanis, there were negative interaction terms between co-ethnic candidature and each of age and generation, but they were far from statistically significant.
100 There are sufficient amounts of self-reported social distance from Whites and since it is not linked to the strength of candidate ethnicity effects it seems unlikely that our null results are due to selfcensoring reported discriminatory behaviour of the kind identified by Terkildsen (1993) . Concerns about racial prejudice for or against candidates is a not such a widely discussed issue in the UK as it is in the US. 101 There were too few cases to examine this sensibly group by group. If anything, incumbents seem to benefit from more co-ethnic voting, not less. Table 2 . See text for more details. 
